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It is now clear that the global economic crisis has hit the Russian economy. The resulting shock 
clearly shows not only the global economic imbalance but also the distinct characteristics of 
emerging Russian markets. The Russian economy already changed its structure under the high 
economic growth of the early to mid-2000s, and has since then become too sensitive to the 
global market and the oil price. However, the Russian markets involve the strong hand of the 
government, and the anti-crisis policy gives this hand constancy. The crisis process and the 
anti-crisis measures characterize the Russian market institutions. The current paper investigates 
the characteristics of the Russian markets under both the economic growth period and the crisis 
period, and offers perspective on the market transition. 
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 1Introduction 
The global crisis from the U.S. sub-prime loan has proven contagious to emerging markets, 
including transition economies. These transition economies have achieved high economic growth 
during the early to mid-2000s and, at that point, may well have been regarded as having already 
finished their transitional period. However, the financial crisis made the European economies 
unstable (EBRD, 2008). Although the East-Central European economies have adopted the export-led 
reorganisation and technological upgrading through the foreign capital and achieved the ‘miracle 
transformation’, and although they built westernised market mechanisms by joining the European 
Union, the crisis has kept tight hold of them. According to the last Eurostat, euroindicators 
(117/2009, 13 August2009), in 2009 Q2 the Baltic states (Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) recorded 
the worst GDP decline (minus 17-23%) compared with the previous quarter, and Slovenia, Romania, 
Czech and Hungary followed them.   
Russia also could not escape the global shock, and in 2008, the Russian economy hit both its 
peak and its nadir. ‘The global crisis has put a sudden end to the strong recovery of the Russian 
economy since the financial crisis of 1998’ (OECD, 2009, p.9). One of the most distinct phenomena 
was a stock index of the Russian stock markets, and even though in Q2 2009 the stock price seemed 
to improve, Russia may be regarded one of the most critical economies among the above transition 
economies and Japan. Paradoxically speaking, if we acknowledge that the global business cycle 
involved the Russian economy, it is not an exaggeration to say that the Russian market transition is 
over. At the same time, the global crisis shock permeates Russia’s national economy, based on the 
domestic factors. Therefore, the investigation of the Russian crisis produces sufficient data for the 
reconsideration of Russian market institutions’ characteristics. 
   The current paper investigates the characteristics of the Russian markets under periods of 
economic growth and crisis, and examines the perspective of the market transition. Particularly, I 
focus on the changes of the economic structure under the growth and the crisis, and examine the 
institutional norm and the relationship between the government and business. 
 
1. Reconsidered economic growth in the 2000s 
When we investigate the transition economies, the initial conditions cannot be neglected. Similarly, 
in order to clarify the economic crisis in Russia, while the global impact is remarkably strong, the 
nation’s pre-crisis economic structure must be sufficiently taken into account. 
Thus far in the twenty-first century, the Russian economy has achieved ambitious goals for 
economic growth and has improved the market institutions under the stable political situation (the 
Putin government). Figure 1 indicates the fluctuation of GDP after the transformation, and indicates 
the stark contrast between the dark 1990s (with a decline and the 1998 crisis under Boris Yeltsin) and 
the bright 2000s under Vladimir Putin. 
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Note: The year 2009 is estimate of the Russian government (-2.2% decline). 
Source: Rosstat, 1997, 2000, 2008. 
 
      While sustainability of economic growth has been a controversial issue, the growth involved the 
following structural features, which determined the growth path of the Russian economy. In short, 
Russia after the growth is completely different from Russia before the growth. 
   First of all, Russia achieved high economic growth, and energy and resources occupied the 
centre of that growth. The Russian economy has changed into a pure oil-producing region, like the 
Middle East
3. The oil and gas reserve and production steadily increased in the 2000s. Oil production 
increased from 313 million tonnes in 2000 to 488 million tons in 2008 (an increase of 56%), and gas 
production increased from 555 billion cubic meters to 663 billion cubic meters (an increase of 19%) 
in the same period
4. The oil reserve increased from 45 billion barrels in 2001 to 79.5 billion barrels 
in mid-2008 (Ia.Lisovolik, Vedomosti, 21 April 2008), and Gazprom increased its supply ability 
owing to an enlargement of purchase in Central Asia. Table 1 shows a dramatic increase in gas and 
oil exports. The share of oil and gas in the total export increased from 35.8% in 1997 to 65.8% in 
2008. Particularly, the drastic increase of export price after 2005 expanded the share and value of oil 
and gas exports. As a result, exports accounted for around half of crude oil and petroleum products 
                                                  
3 In Saudi Arabia, the oil sector occupied around 90% of the total export in the 2000s (http://www.mofa.go.jp, 14 
December 2009). 
4  Sakaguchi (2009) criticises a rapid increase of oil production during 2000-2004 as a speed-up of exhaustion of west 
Siberian resource. 
 3and for a third of natural gas. Moreover, Russia exports various kinds of natural resources: coal, 
mineral fertiliser, cellulose and paper, rolled iron, nickel, cobalt, aluminium, titan, zinc and others. It 
is easy to estimate that more than 80% of exports consist of natural resources and that during the 
economic growth in the 2000s, Russia stimulated the energy and resource (oil and gas) dependent 
economy. 
 
Table 1 Export of oil and gas   
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Cubic meter billion 
         $ billion  10.7 11.1 11.6 16.6 17.8 15.9 20.0 21.9 31.7 43.8 44.8 69.1 
Total    
$ billion 
31.1 23.8 29.6 52.5 52.2 56.3 73.8  100.2 148.9 190.8 218.5 310.1 
Share of export (%)  35.8  32.0  39.1  50.0  51.2  52.5  54.3  54.7  61.1  62.9  61.7  65.8 
Crude Oil export 
price      $/barrel 
   23.9  20.8  21.0  23.8  31.0 45.2 56.3 64.3 90.7 
Gas export price 
    $ /   m
3  thousand 
   85.8  98.3  85.7  105.5  109.1 151.4 216.0 233.7 353.7 
Source: Central bank Russia, 14 December 2009, http://www.cbr.ru. 
 
   This structure cannot be non-influential to the Russian economy as whole. The government 
increased receipts via foreign reserves and tax revenue, and thanks to high tax revenue, the fiscal 
balance continued to be at a surplus in the 2000s. According to Table 2, tax on the corporate profits, 
VAT, and tariffs on the natural recourses and customs (which are related to oil and gas) accounted for 
a majority of receipts. It is no exaggeration to say that the state budget has become subordinate to the 
flexible oil price. Because the oil price is based on the global financial markets with short-term funds, 
Russia has become sensitive to global finance (Mau, 2009, p.6). In short, the authority and the 
economic role of the government heavily depend on oil and gas, and global finance. 
      An increase in exports has gone hand-in-hand with an increase of imports. Table 3 shows that in 
the 2000s, an increase of import exceeded that of export. In practice, consumption and investment 
have become driving forces behind the growth, and they grow higher than the GDP growth rate. The 
automobile sector expands its sales in the domestic market, and the foreign companies (including 
those in Japan) may well have great interest in the Russian market. The development of the retail 
 4commercial companies also indicates an increase of consumption (Mizobata, 2009). An increase of 
production and growth leads to an enlargement of employment and an increase in real wages, and is 
followed by an increase of consumption and the raising of the living standard. And then, 
consumption leads to an increase in investment and production. In the 2000s, while the export sector 




Table 2 Integrated government finance (%) 
 1995  1998  2000  2004  2007 
Financial deficit and 
surplus 
-11.2(-5.2)  -22.6(-3.0)  12.6(1.9) 14.0(4.5) 23.1(6.0) 
Tax on the corporate 
profits 
26.9  14.5 19.0 16.0 8.2 
VAT  21.9  24.8 21.8 19.7 29.1 
Tariffs on the natural 
resources use 
2.8 3.3  3.7  10.7  14.9 
Customs  and  others  5.7  5.0  10.9 15.8 31.0 
Note: deficit and surplus is % in the total federal finance, and % in GDP. Others are % in the federal budget. 
Source: Rosstat, 2000, 2007, 2008. 
 
Table 3 Foreign trade of Russia ($ billion) 
  1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Change  2000-2008
export  82.4 105.0 101.9  107.3  135.9 183.2 243.8 303.6 354.4 471.6 349% 
import  62.6  44.9 53.8   61.0   76.1  97.4 125.4 164.3 223.5 291.9 366% 
balance  19.8   60.2  48.1   46.3   59.9 85.8 118.4 139.3 130.9 179.7 - 
Source: Central bank Russia, 14 December 2009, http://www. cbr.ru. 
 
   Therefore, the economic growth has changed the Russian economy, making it sensitive to the 
global economy and its business fluctuation. Oil price and the exchange rate, in particular, have 
become very sensitive to the macroeconomic growth of the Russian economy. The Russian 
economic growth accompanies a twin surplus -- i.e., budget surplus and foreign trade surplus -- 
                                                  
5 Appreciation of Ruble has stimulated an increase of imports. Imported food occupied 36-50% of domestic food 
consumption. The share in Moscow and St. Petersburg is regarded as 70-80%. Particularly, medicine and food for 
children heavily depend on import. The food reserve was 100 days in 1970-1985 USSR periods, and these days 
declined to 48 in 1996, 31 in 2001, and 32 in 2005. (See E.Lar’kin, and N. Mikhailova, Profile, No.18, 18 May 2009, 
pp.12-15) 
 5which represents a complete contrast with the US economy during 1980-2008
6. 
The economic growth in the 2000s, however, cannot be regarded as a simple economic boom. 
Overheating of consumption and successive high inflation remind us of the bubble economy, 
although the Russian banks do not play sufficient intermediating functions to make a direct 
comparison. At the very least, in the 2000s, the stock price and the real estate price increased 
drastically under the economic boom, and excessive money flowed into the markets. According to 
MICEX Index (2009)
7, MICEX index (stock index) increased parallel to GDP growth. In addition, 
we can confirm a drastic price-jump in real estate by the Index of Real Estate in the 2000s
8. 
‘Profitability and transaction volumes of the Russian stock markets changed after the oil price, and 
from the middle of 2006, stock bubble began to be created. After the stock market, bubble spread 
into the real estate market. A rise of securities’ quotation stimulated stock owners to attract large 
amount of money, and money was invested to more expensive projects… Heated price increase in 
the initial resident market brought about speculative interests in investment in this sector. The real 
estate market organised the specific “exchange” where players earned 100% profits. Thus, the stock 
bubble supported another bubble, residential bubble’ (Zamaraev, Kiyutsevskaya, Nazarova, 
Sukhanov, 2009, pp.6-7).   
   Secondly, in the 2000s, credit grows and ‘rapid money supply growth in Russia has often 
resulted in excess liquidity, in particular in 2001, 2004-05 and between 2007 and the first quarter of 
2008’ (OECD, 2009, p.80). The CBR’s (Central Bank Russia) monetary policy became too 
accommodating with domestic real interest rates remaining negative, and foreign borrowing became 
favourable as US and other western interest rates were very low. In short, ‘the government and the 
CBR could not restrict an excessive money supply from the high oil price and capital inflow. This 
situation enlarged the aggregate demand of the economy and lead to the credit boom
9’ (Kudrin, 2009, 
p.20). Under the boosted domestic boom and inflationary pressure and permission of free capital 
flows
10, cheap access to credit or existence of cheap money has flowed into emerging markets, 
including Russia. Particularly, as long as oil money flowed into Russia, a surplus of money supply 
may be created with no trouble. 
   However, the process is not so simple. The balance of payments in Russia (Table 4) indicates a 
specific structure. Although trade balance continues to be at a surplus and increases in the 2000s, 
services record constant deficits. Changes in reserve assets are linked with trade balance, and in the 
2000s, it is obvious that Russia increased foreign reserve. Capital and financial accounts indicate an 
                                                  
6  US almost constantly recorded a twin deficit: fiscal deficit and trade deficit. In the 2000s, foreign trade deficit was 
between $400 and $700 billion, and the federal budget deficit was between $160 and $410 billion (US Census  
Bureau, 2009). 
7  26 August 2009, http://www.micex.com. 
8  26 August 2009, http://www.irn.ru. 
9 The credit to construction increased by 85.8% on 1
st October 2007 than the previous October, and increased by 
81.5% on 1
st October 2008 (Kudrin, 2009, p.20). 
10  On 1 July 2006, full ruble convertibility was introduced. 
 6increase of outflow and overseas assets. At the very least, trade balance accompanies dynamism of 
capital and financial account and changes in reserve assets. 
 













1992 -0.1 3.7  -3.1 2.4  -1.9  -0.4 
1993 9.0  12.6 -2.1 -4.4  -3.9  -0.7 
1994 7.8  16.9 -7.0 -10.2  1.9  0.5 
1995 7.0  19.8 -9.6 12.1  -10.4  -8.7 
1996 10.8 21.6 -5.4 -6.4  2.8  -7.3 
1997 -0.1 14.9 -5.9 10.8  -1.9  -8.8 
1998 0.2  16.4 -4.1 3.8  5.3  -9.4 
1999 24.6 36.0 -4.3 -14.4  -1.8  -8.5 
2000 46.8 60.2 -6.7 -21.5  -16.0  -9.3 
2001 33.9 48.1 -9.1 -16.2  -8.2  -9.6 
2002 29.1 46.3 -9.9 -11.7  -11.4  -6.1 
2003 35.4 59.9 -10.9  0.1  -26.4  -9.2 
2004 59.5 85.8 -12.7  -8.4  -45.2  -5.9 
2005 84.6 118.4  -13.8  -15.2  -61.5  -7.9 
2006 94.9 139.3  -13.6  3.3  -107.5 9.5 
2007 77.0 130.9  -19.6  84.8  -148.9 -12.9 
2008  102.4 179.7 -25.1 -135.2  45.3  -12.6 
2009  Q1-3  32.1 74.8 -14.2  -46.1  21.8  -7.9 
Source: Central bank Russia, 14 December 2009, http://www. cbr.ru. 
 
From the beginning of the transformation, international finance did not play a main role in the 
Russian markets. In 1994, more than 90% of finance came from domestic capital, with the global 
financial markets provided just 8% of funds. However, after the opening of state bond markets, the 
situation changed significantly. In 1998, the ratio shifted to 42% domestic and 58% foreign. The 
international financial markets provided the domestic funds. In 1994, two thirds of the government 
deficits were supplied by the funds of the central bank. The government offered state bonds, and the 
foreign funds flowed into Russia through domestic commercial banks with forward transactions. 
Mizobata (1999) considered the monetary stabilisation policy and characteristics dependent on state 
bonds and external debts as the 1995 structure, and concluded that the 1995 structure became a 
 7direct factor in the 1998 crisis. The following points should not be neglected in our attempts to 
understand the external balance: 1) two thirds of the external debt was a legacy of the USSR (Table 
5); and 2) due to a cheap petroleum price, not only foreign reserves but also internal funds of 
enterprises and banks were not sufficient with respects to the outflow of foreign funds. 
  
Table 5 International balance and external debts ($ billion, the end of the year) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Current balance  -0.08  0.2  24.6 46.8 33.9 29.1 35.4 59.5 84.4 94.3 77.0 102.4
Trade balance  14.9 16.4 36.0 60.2 48.1 46.3 59.9 85.8 118.4  139.3  130.9  179.7
Export  86.9 74.4 75.6 105.0 101.9 107.3 135.9 183.2 243.8  303.6  354.4  471.6
Import  72.0 58.0 39.5 44.9 53.8 61.0 76.1 97.4 125.4  164.3  223.5  291.9
Foreign direct 
investment 
4.9 2.8 3.3 2.7 2.7 3.5 8.0 15.5  12.9  29.7  54.3  58.7 
External  debts    
(to government) 
149.9 158.4 148.9 128.6 111.1 104.3 106.0 97.4  71.4  48.6  46.4  32.8 
 Ex-USSR  95.1 98.2 96.8 65.8 61.0 55.9 58.3 56.1 34.5 9.4  7.1  4.6 
External  debts    
(to non-government) 
33.0 30.0 29.2 31.4 35.2 48.0 80.0 108.9 176.2  261.9  419.2  447.7
External debts per 
GDP (%) 
44.4 67.8 93.3 65.1 50.5 43.8 39.4 33.5 30.9 31.4 36.0 28.6 
Note: Based on Rosstat data (nominal GDP in ruble) and Central bank Russia data (nominal dollar rate), I estimated 
GDP in 2008 (1679.7 billion $). 
Source: Central bank Russia, 17 December 2009, http://www.cbr.ru, Rosstat, 17 December 2009, http://www.gks.ru. 
 
Table 6 External debts of enterprises ($ billion) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
2  4  8  14 33 30 80 108  175  262  417  488 
Source: Ershov, 2008, p.14. 
 
Table 7 Net international investment position (end of the year, $ billion) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Nonfinancial 
companies 
-56 -117  -202  -307  -513 
Russia, total  +4  -11  -32  -36  -127 
Source: 19 February 2009, http://www.cbr.ru, Ershov, 2008, p.14. 
  After 2001, Russia increased private external borrowing during times of economic growth. 
 8Although enterprises also increased internal reserves and the government significantly increased 
foreign reserves, the non-state sector is eager for financing. Therefore, external debts to the 
government decreased, and enterprises and banks increased their debts, up to around $500 billion. 
(Table 6) As a result, the international position
11 became worse (Table 7). External borrowing was 
based on short-term loans. Until the 1998 crisis, the average maturity date was 150 days. In 2008, 
the maturity shortened and more than 30% of debts were in a period shorter than one year. 
 




















Note: Capital flight is estimated as the sum of the two line items from the CBR’s balance of payment: (1) exports 
receipts overdue + imports paid for and not received + transfers for fictitious operations in securities, and (2) errors 
and omissions. 
Source: 8 September 2009, http://www.cbr.ru, Hanson, 2007, p.873. 
 
   The Russian private sector satisfied its insatiable thirst for money with foreign borrowing. A 
large monetary inflow accompanied the following characteristics. Capital inflow constantly 
accompanied capital flight (Figure 2), and they show a symmetrical trend. The Russian money 
flowed out via various kinds of paths. For example, purchase of Shibneft by Gazprom (domestic 
acquisition) was transacted through the international settlement, and offshore (tax heaven) areas are 
often used as the intermediation. Therefore, some parts of money inflow are closely connected with 
                                                  
11  Foreign assets – debts. 
 9the return of domestic money. The close linkage of foreign money and domestic money is called 
‘parallel economy' (Kheifets, 2007). 
   The economic growth in the 2000s has caused the drastic changes in the Russian economy, and 
Russia has constantly maintained a twin surplus. However, it is fragile. The economy intensified its 
export dependence and foreign capital dependence, and the domestic economy regards the global 
economy as indispensable for continuous growth. The changes mean that the Russian economy 
intensified its sensitivity to the global economy and the global price (oil price). In short, once the 
crisis happened, Russia had a predisposition to be seriously affected and contagious. 
 
2. The global crisis hit 
The economic crisis began surfacing in September 2008, following the government bailout of the 
U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers. While the Russian invasion of Georgia caused a drop in 
stock prices, it did not directly lead to crisis (Hanson, 2008). Rather, the global stock price decline of 
September brought about major shock in Russia, and the RTS (the Russian stock exchange) index 
plunged 17.7% during a week in late October; and the MICEX index also dropped 20% in 
November and remained down for a month. As of December 19, the RTS fell 74%; and Japanese 
stocks declined 40%, U.S. stocks 30%, Shanghai (Chinese) stocks 30%, and German stocks 30%. 
The global crisis spread rapidly. Leading companies like Gazprom marked down their stock prices, 
and many financial institutions recorded a deficit. The crisis also became evident in financial 
accounts, which quickly switched from surplus to deficit. The crisis started from a sharp drop in the 
stock price, which reminds us a collapse of bubble economy. At the same time, the real estate price 
also declined, and developers and construction companies suffered. 
   All the economic indicators showed a sharp decline after September 2008. To make matters 
worse, the crisis penetrated widely, from the financial sector to the real sector. 
   First of all, Repo markets
12 have rapidly grown in the short-term financial markets. Figure 3 
shows a vivid increase of Repo markets among the financial markets
13. In the stock market, the 
share of Repo grew rapidly -- more than 300% in the time period from 2005 to 2008. An increase of 
Repo can be observed in all the obligations: stocks, corporate obligations, regional obligations and 
municipal obligations (Table 8). An increase of Repo markets was a natural response to austerity 
fiscal policy of the government (Delyagin, Sheyanov, 2009, p.95). The speculative economy became 
a product of the economic growth in the 2000s. 
However, the lack of liquidity blew repo markets off in an instance. During 8-15 September 2008, 
dishonoured Repo markets reached 7.2 billion rubles, of which 7.1 billion rubles were due to 
                                                  
12 Repo is a shortened form of the English phrase ‘Repurchase agreement’, and it means financing based on buying 
and selling obligations in the definite period. One party lends obligations with money as collateral. One party gets 
money and the other gains obligations. Repo includes two types: special collateral trade (needs to lend specific 
obligations), and general collateral trade (needs money with obligations he has). 
13  The year 1997 indicated an extraordinary increase in stock markets and repo markets. 
 10‘KIT-finance’ (Zamaraev, Kiyutsevskaya, Nazarova, Sukhanov, 2009, pp. 9-11). ‘As a result, a chain 
of mutual closed obligation collapsed, and Repo markets started to fall down’ (Zamaraev, 
Kiyutsevskaya, Nazarova, Sukhanov, 2009, p. 11). The crisis set off a chain reaction in various 
financial markets. 
 


















Source: MICEX, 9 September 2009, http://www.micex.ru. 
 
Table 8 Repo markets grow (share of repo to the total: %) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 year Q1 Q2
first
half
Stocks 18.3 25.6 32.6 47.6 58.1 56.5 50.5 58.0 62.4 60.3
Corporate obligations 28.0 50.9 64.3 69.7 74.6 72.5 71.2 77.9 77.9 77.9
Regional obligations 28.0 60.0 73.7 77.7 84.5 82.2 79.9 83.8 86.1 85.1




Source: Zamaraev, Kiyutsevskaya, Nazarova, Sukhanov, 2009, p.10. 
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Moreover, Russian enterprises and banks have largely increased their borrowing from abroad 
during the period of economic growth; this is accomplished through an increase in the price of 
petroleum. Their foreign borrowing reached approximately $500 billion, of which $160 billion had 
to be redeemed by the end of 2008 with an interest of $45 billion. The major enterprises and banks 
had become debtors: Gazprom ($60 billion), Rosneft ($26 billion), VTB ($21 billion), UC Rusal 
($14 billion) and Sevelstal’ ($6 billion), among others. Almost all of the large enterprises and banks 
were financed from abroad, and most of them have financed an M&A transaction and have had a 
closed connection with the government. 
In effect, they borrowed money on their own stocks. For example, Alfa Group was financed via a 
Deutsche Bank with the stocks of Vimpelcom (44%) as collateral. Seventy-five percent of stocks in 
SegimoiContinent (supermarket) were held as collateral (D'Shtrikh, No.22, November 2008, p. 8). 
However, when the stock price fell, collateral values dropped in a single stroke. Debtors were 
obliged to enlarge their collateral or sell their stocks, and margin calls occurred (Shastitko, 2008, 
p.134). The crisis brought about arrears of banks (bad loans), and the first victims were KIT-finance 
and Svyasibank (Profile, No. 36, 6 October 2008, pp. 26-27). While KIT-finance was bought up by 
RZhD (45%) and G Alrosa (45%) at a price of 100 rubles, its goal was to prevent the transfer of 
Rostelecom stocks (40%) owned by KIT-finance to the ‘unfavourable’ owner. In the end, Alfa Group 
received finance ($2 billion) from the government, and could evade its loss of Vimpelcom’s stocks 
through margin calls. 
The financial institutions were ultimately exposed in this crisis. The crisis in the banking sector 
can be divided into the following phases: threshold of the crisis in July to 15 September 2008, 
liquidity crisis in 15 September to the end of October 2008, managed devaluation in November 2008 
to the end of January 2009, and involvement of bad loans in February 2009 and beyond (Ekspert, No. 
20, 25-31 May 2009). 
At the beginning of November 2008, the total deposits of customers decreased from 78 billion 
rubles to 39 billion for a month, and depositors withdrew 42% of their deposits. Withdrawn deposits 
(Table 9) were quickly converted to foreign currency to prepare for the crisis. Such behaviour was 
similar to that in 1997. In October 2008, the composition of residents’ expenditure was as follows: 
74% in purchase of goods and service, 15% in compulsory payments and taxes, 0.3% in ruble saving, 
and 10.2% in foreign currency, where foreign currency doubled during the January-September 
period in 2008 (5.6%). (Vedomosti, 4 December 2008) 
Total bank losses were $6.7 billion, and credit to corporations decreased from $93.8 billion to 
$80 billion from September to October and overdue liabilities (bad loans) reached $8.2 billion, a 
tenfold increase. Retail credit also decreased by $3 billion (a drop of one third), and bad loans 
 12increased by 13 times during the same period. Automobile credit also remarkably shrinked
14. 
‘The crisis certified failure of the business model in the bank SvyzInvest. This bank used the 
short-term borrowing in the inter-bank markets for the transaction in stock markets and short-term 
credit to the customers in stock markets’ (Vedomosti, 28 November 2008). The banks themselves 
actively participated in the stock markets, and they borrowed money on their own stocks as collateral. 
Therefore, a decline in stock price was directly connected to bad loans. The crisis hit the banking 
sector directly. The low ratio of owners’ equity, the immature financial markets, and long-term loans 
using short-term borrowing have amplified the crisis. 
 
Table 9. Changes of saving 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
(estimate) 
An increase of saving 
(billion Ruble) 
468 790 1047  1347  1026.3 
An increasing rate (%)  30  39  38.2  35.6  20 
Source: Vedomosti, 27 November 2008. 
 
Generally speaking, the accurate judgment of bad loans is difficult due to lack of the able 
evaluators. According to Gref and Yudaeva (2009, p.12), only 26% debtor firms responded that they 
could pay back debts. As some banks credited the developer, the potential risk loans simultaneously 
accumulated in the process (Kuznetsova, 2009, p. 9). Even though the Russian banks are generally 
reluctant to give a loan, the crisis is more severe than its appearance. 
   The banking sector diffused the crisis. In September 2008, the banks decreased their credits not 
only to enterprises but also to consumers (retail banking), and a credit crunch emerged. Suspensions 
of credit led several enterprises into bankruptcy
15, especially those sectors heavily dependent on 
external communication and manufacturing (Profile, No. 40, 27 October 2008). Housing loans and 
car loans occupied the main part of consumer credits, and a reduction of loans brought about a fall in 
demand for residences, offices, automobiles and other sectors. Prosperity suddenly turned into an 
economic slowdown. 
   The Russian crisis should be considered not only as financial but also as economic. The global 
crisis caused a global deterioration in demand, and a sharp decline in petroleum price also occurred. 
Dual pressure of demand (shrinking foreign borrowing and price down of export) functioned in 
Russia (Delyagin, Sheyanov, 2009, pp.88-93). The Russian economy, with its high dependence on 
                                                  
14  In the first half of 2009, automobile credit decreased to a fifth compared to the same period of 2008 (Ekonomika i 
zhizn’, No.34 August 2009). 
15 Concerning the bankruptcy law, Russian law does not hold article 11 of the USA law, guarantee of creditors in 
court, rescue of companies by transfer of credit to stocks. (Vedomosti, 8 December 2008) 
 13natural resources, is sensitive to the petroleum price, and a decline of that price is linked directly to 
the business recession and the crisis. The crisis fermented in sectors apart from finance. 
   The production was diminished by three waves. The first wave was caused by reduction of 
speculation and expensive credit, and the production plan was forced to stop. Developers had to 
discontinue construction work. A decline in employment and income led to reduced production 
(demand), and a chain of reduction affected whole the economy. The second wave came from 
reduction of export profits and the cessation of exporting resources. In succession, the third wave 
was caused by a decline in the state budget, which started in September 2008 (Delyagin, 2009, 
pp.188-189). 
 
Table 10    Petroleum price and export tariffs ($/barrel) 
 Petroleum  Price  Export  Tariffs 
1 August 2008  121.61  63 
1 October 2008  90  59 
1 November 2008  59.15  39.4 
Source: Vedomosti, 27 November 2008. 
 
















average real export price
average world oil 'Urals' price
Source: Ekonomika i zhizn’, No.33, August 2009. 
 
As a result, in December 2008, the positive GDP growth became negative, and the recession is 
believed to continue in the medium run. In the first quarter 2009, GDP declined by 9.5% (annual 
base), and was estimated to decline by 8.5% in 2009
16. Russia is regarded as a case of ‘hard landing’ 
(Aleksashenko, 2009, p.4). The crisis from petroleum prices has extended to the real sector and the 
                                                  
16 A.Kudrin estimated this decline and he considered Russia recovers to the pre-crisis level in 2012 (8 September 
2009, http://news.yandex.ru). In the first half of 2009, GDP declined by 10.4%, compared with the ratio to the same 
period of previous year (Rosstat, 14 December 2009, http://www.gks.ru). 
 14state sector, which is deeply dependent upon natural resources. The government also reduced export 
tariffs (Vedmosti, 5 December 2008). The price in December 2008 fell to the level not seen since July 
2004
17, and this case would bring about financial difficulties in 2009. Petroleum revenue decreased 
after the third quarter of 2008, and the oil companies experienced a decrease in profits and export 
values. Moreover, the change in price was too swift to coordinate with export tariffs (Vedomosti, 8 
December 2008). (Table 10, Figure 4) In the first and second quarters of 2009, the total energy 
export revenues shrank by half, compared with same periods of 2008 (Table 11). In the end, the state 
budget changed from surplus to deficit (6-8% in 2009). 
 
Table 11 Oil and gas export under the crisis 
  2008 Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  2009 Q1  Q2 
61.2 61.5 59.4 61.0 60.5 62.4 
38.6 47.1 47.7 27.7 17.9 22.9 
Crude oil tonnes million 
        $  billion 
Export price    $/barrel  86.4 104.7  109.9  62.2 40.4 50.2 
28.1 28.6 31.5 29.9 31.3 28.8 
17.7 20.7 26.2 15.3 9.2  9.6 
Oil products tonnes million 
          $   b i l l i o n  
Export price    $/tonn  628 726 832 511 293 333 
59.8 49.6 40.8 45.1 25.0 37.3 
17.9 17.2 16.2 17.8 7.8  9.6 
Natural gas cubic meter billion 
    $ billion 
Export price    $/m
3 thosand  300 347 396 394 311 256 
Source: Central bank Russia, 23 November 2009, http://www.cbr.ru. 
 
Construction, development and retail are regarded as the most critical sectors in Russia. 
According to the government (RBKdaily, 20 November 2008), while overdue liabilities accounted 
for 38% of the total in manufacturing, construction recorded the highest (73%). Moreover, the global 
crisis has already negatively affected almost all economic sectors: mineral resources, 
machine-building and metallurgy, chemical, food production, furniture, transportation and others. In 
the following sectors, the critical shock has been relatively small: telecommunications, cheap goods, 
financial institutions receiving state support, and big businesses capable of purchasing bankrupt 
companies. Except mineral resource, the price shock covered metallurgy and chemical production 
(INSOR, 2009, p.7)
18. Investment was also discouraged in 2009. For example, oil companies 
diminished their investment by 25% in 2009 (Ekspert, No.20, 25-31 May 2009). 
Defaults indicate the critical situation (Table 12). The number and the scale of defaults increased 
                                                  
17  Export prices declined from July 2008, and increased from March 2009. 
18  The price declined by 33-50% (INSOR, 2009, p.7). 
 15under the crisis
19. In 2008-2009, there were 125 defaults and 8 defaults of Eurobonds. Particularly, 
we can observe many cases in the following sectors: commerce, construction, transportation, 
manufacturing, financial sector, agriculture and others. 
 
Table 12 Defaults of corporate bonds (cases) 
  
 2008  2009.January-April  Total 
Defaults total  56  77  133 
Refinanced loan  8  18  26 
Technical defaults  25  14  39 
Note: Defaults of Eurobonds were included. 
Source: Gnedovsky, 2009, p.27. 
 







2008April June Aug. Oct. Dec. Feb. April June
employment
Source: Rosstat, 8 September 2009, http://www.gks.ru 
 







2008Apr. July Oct 2009Jan April July
unemployment rate
                                                  
19  Here I show official data, and there were quite more defaults in reality. 
 16 Source: Rosstat, 8 September 2009, http://www.gks.ru 
 
The economic crisis extended to labour markets as well. In August-November 2008
20, 11% of 
large enterprises reduced their personnel, and 34% more were also planning a reduction. At the end 
of October 2008, the unemployed reached 4.6 million (6.1%) and it reached 6.4 million (8.5%) in 
February 2009. The labour market shifted from one that was understaffed to one that was overstaffed. 
Banks cut employee numbers on a large scale, particularly in investment branches where reduction 
was greater. The MDM bank is planning to cut staff by 40%, and this trend extends to the entire 
banking sector and investment companies (Vedomosti, 1 December 2008). Figure 5 clarifies a sharp 
decline of employment from August 2008 to February 2009, and Figure 6 indicates a sharp increase 
of unemployment in the same period, while after February 2009 the situation has improved a little. 
The social strain worsened by a wage decline, inflation, wage arrears, constraints of consumer 
credits and others. The collective contracts were revised for the worse, and there was no resistance 
within the firm. At the very least, the recent shock is estimated to continue for two years (INSOR, 
2009, pp.7-9)
21. As a result, the crisis deteriorated the living standard
22. 
   The crisis also involves regional gaps. In the company town centred on the metal industry, the 
corporation crisis extends to a regional crisis. Ural and Siberia are the most critical areas, while the 
southern area is regarded as relatively less critical. Particularly, the enterprise town
23 was regarded 
as serious for survival in the crisis. 
      However, after the first quarter of 2009, we can observe some symptoms which signal the end of 
the panic period. Particularly, there are some regions which have indicated the growth trend. 
A.Kudrin, the Minister of Finance, considered Russia got out of the crisis in August. I.Shuvalov, the 
first vice-prime minister also announced a recovery of the economic growth (8 September 2009, 
http://www.nr2.ru). Oil price increased after May 2009, and the ruble exchange rate seems to be 
stabilised. Many corporations are restructuring and servicing their debts. The resident house price 
began to increase. In July 2009, almost all economic indicators were better than in June. 
Unemployment also declined to 5.8 million (7.7%) in October 2009 (Rosstat, 15 December 2009, 
http://www.gks.ru). The strategic research centre also announced that the people felt the economic 
recovery in autumn 2009 (Ekonomika i zhizn', No.44, November 2009). In order to judge the perspective of 
recovery, we need re-examine the content of the crisis in the Russian markets. 
 
                                                  
20 Ernst  &  Young  (Ekonomika i zhizn', No.48, November 2008). 
21  Unemployment cannot be overvalued as a crisis phenomenon. Unemployment is insufficient to show the business 
cycle, and the unchanged employment and an increase of informal sector have continued to function (V. Gimpelson, 
Vedomosti, 18 March 2009). 
22 The population with less than subsistence (5083 rubles in the first quarter of 2009) increased from 23 million 
(16.3% of population) in the first quarter of 2008 to 24.5 million (17.4%) in the first quarter of 2009. Rosstat, 8 
September 2009, http://www.gks.ru 
23  The enterprise towns occupied 40% of the total cities and a quarter of urban population (Profile, 18 May 2009). 
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3. Outcomes of the crisis: A collapse in the growth factors 
The economic crisis is greatly influenced not only by the global economy but also by national 
specificities. Further, the crisis was contagious among not only the weak economies but also those 
showing strong macroeconomic performance; as a matter of course, the transition economies and 
emerging markets became the main target. Therefore, an investigation of the outcome of the crisis in 
Russia, which had a twin surplus, helps us understand the impact of the crisis on the growth factors 
(changes under the growth in the 2000s) and the response of economic actors. 
Although at the beginning of the crisis, the government did not take any serious measures to 
address the crisis, when the economy entered into a critical phase, the government changed its 
attitude. The subsequent dismal economic performance seems to have led Russian economists to 
describe extreme scenarios. These often included the ‘hard landing’ scenario
24, which played out as 
follows: The dominant position of Russia’s resource exports would worsen the balance of payments, 
and a decline in the developed countries would further worsen the performance through a multiplier 
effect. The deteriorated economy would then result in a large deficit in the state budget, and the 
government would be unable to rescue the economy. The actual situation is steadily approaching this 
scenario. 
Russia experienced an economic crisis in 1998. The crisis was caused by the issuance of 
short-term bonds by the government (the so-called GKOs) and worsened by the East Asian currency 
crisis. The current economic crisis in Russia has some characteristics in common with the 1998 crisis, 
namely, the impact of a global crisis on the economy and the fragility of domestic markets. In 
particular, in 1998, non-monetary transactions such as arrears and barter prevailed under a policy of 
austerity and stabilization, and the government financed the deficit using short-term state bonds 
(GKOs). In 1996, the sale of state bonds to foreigners was permitted, and the inflow of speculative 
money triggered the crisis. However, there is a vast difference between the situations in 2008 and 
1998: in the 2008 crisis, Russia had a twin surplus and showed a strong economic performance. 
Figures 7 and 8 indicate the contrast between Russia’s international financial flow and final 
debtors. In 1998, state bonds became an object of speculation, and the international flow naturally 
compensated the government deficits. Enterprises increased profits not by bringing about growth in 
the real sector but by appealing to the government (rent-seeking behaviour) or by purchasing stocks 
and bonds. The funds did not reach the real sectors, and monetary circulation within the domestic 
market deteriorated drastically. 
 
 
                                                  






















Global oil and gas markets  International fiancial 
markets 
banks 
Enterprises  Households   
 


















Foreign reserves  Enterprises  Households 
 
   
 19In the 2000s, international funds financed the Russian market through IPOs or loans, and the 
volume of cheap money that poured into the M&A market matched that in Japan. The money was 
primarily used not for productive investments but rather for speculation and the acquisition of 
ownership. It stands to reason that the Repo markets grew. Credit (including repos) provided to the 
private sector, excluding bank credit, increased by 18.9% in 2006, 75.1% in 2007 and 124.8% in 
2008
25. In Russia, there were numerous M&As in the energy and metal sectors. Only 20–30% of the 
M&A funds were internal funds, and external funds became the primary source. The external sources 
of funds included, among other sources, IPOs, bank loans, financing from investment funds and 
corporate bonds; the international market supplied funds in demand because of high domestic 
financial costs. Syndicated loans and Euro bonds increased as well. Moreover, the number of IPOs 
increased from five in 2004, involving a mere $600 million, to 25, involving a total of $23.64 billion 
in 2007
26—a 40 fold increase in the amounts raised. The increase in the number of IPOs also 
increased stock trading. Moreover, the main major IPOs raising funds were not necessarily from the 
pure private sector alone. For example, in 2008, the largest IPOs were issued by the electricity 
company Gazprom and related companies like Gazprombank and Sibur. That is, the debtors were 
part of the semi-state sector or organizations in which the state participated. 
 
Table 13 External debts of Russia 




















Total  257.2 288.8 313.2 399.2 437.8 471.0 535.7 548.2 483.5 450.8 




















  State  organisation  82.1 78.9 48.6 49.0 52.5 46.4 38.9 42.8 32.7 30.1 
  Banks  19.4 27.4 32.0 54.2 59.2 65.5 78.2 71.2 61.7 54.4 
  Other  sectors  49.3 47.6 47.1 72.3 76.7 78.9 81.0 77.2 67.4 62.7 




















  Banks  30.8 39.3 59.8 76.1 87.7 96.9 113.1  125.2  102.9  90.6 
  Other  sectors  75.6 95.6 116.3  122.5 136.0 156.4 191.8 199.0 186.0 179.7 
Note: State sector is defined from the wide meaning which includes not only the state organisations but also banks 
and firms owned by the state. 
Source: 9 September 2009, www.cbr.ru. 
 
                                                  
25  From 2007, the Repo market was included. 
26  Data from IPO in Russia, Russian market IPO, offering.ru (13 February 2008). 
 20Again, I trace the external debts by debtor type. According to Tables 5 and 6, the pure 
government sector reduced its debts and the non-government sector increased its debts. This raises 
the question of who borrowed the money. Table 13 provides a different picture. In 2008, the pure 
government sector reduced its share and the non-government sector increased its share to more than 
90%. However, although the private sector grew in 2006–2008, it still had a smaller share than the 
non-government sector. The state sector (in Table 13) covers the government, monetary-credit 
regulation institutions (monetary sector), banks and non-financial companies in which the 
government and the monetary sector hold more than 50% stake or exercise direct or indirect control. 
Further, the pure private sector indicates the external debt of the domestic actors, which, in the 
broadest interpretation, is equal to the total minus the state’s share. In addition, large-block 
shareholders of the state strongly affect the decision making of the private sector. Thus, the pure 









Figure 9 Share of state secor in external






Source: 9 September 2009, www.cbr.ru. 
 
The problem enterprises, which were mostly determined as private sector, must be regarded as 
the quasi-state, and the government rescued the state sector in practice. Indeed, Mau stated as 
follows: ‘Many debtor enterprises are closely related with the government and behave on the logic of 
“privatization of profits and nationalization of deficits”. In the financial markets, the actors know 
well that the private debtors can be based on the support from the federal budget in the crisis’ (Mau, 
2009, p.10). In short, the moral hazard is shared between business managers and state bureaucrats in 
the sense that the private sector is under state control and follows the principle of ‘privatization of 
profits and nationalization of deficits’; Mau has termed this structure ‘Chebolization’ (Mau, 2009, 
p.11). Moreover, since the main debtors control strategic assets—such as energy and natural 
resources—that are strongly affected by the exchange rate, the state is motivated to support the 
quasi-private sector. This is why the government intervened when margin calls occurred. Thus, the 
crisis under the twin surplus was connected with the specificities of the Russian enterprises and 
 21markets. 
   While the anti-crisis policy may well be Keynesian in nature, the emergency measures have 
taken on a socialist character
27 or dirigisme character
28. The anti-crisis policy of any country is 
unique to the country’s situation and has different outcomes for the economic actors. The policy in 
Russia was based on the strong hand of the government, and is in continuity with that of the 
pre-crisis period. 
The anti-crisis measures in Russia can be divided into two stages. In the first programme of 
November 2008, the goal was to stabilize the financial situation, and the main focus of the policy 
was on issues such as accessibility to financial resources, relaxation of business burdens, 
improvements in social results, stimulation of labour markets, stimulation of domestic demand and 
support to SMEs; the total outlay was estimated to be 9,024 billion roubles (17.5% of the GDP). The 
most striking measure was the support provided to big businesses, particularly those in sectors such 
as automobile, agricultural machines and oil and gas. Protectionist measures that were based on 
populist principles—for example, an increase in custom duties—were also adopted.   
In the second programme of June 2009, the government placed emphasis on social responsibility 
and the linkage between the anti-crisis measures and long-term projects
29. This is why the 
programme is regarded as an anti-crisis modernization programme. The total outlay was estimated to 
be 9,692.2 billion roubles (24% of the GDP)
30. The government prioritized the following issues: (1) 
social security, including employment, pension system, housing, etc.; (2) the development of 
production and technological potential by increasing efficiency; (3) the activation of domestic 
demand for Russian products using state investment and state order; (4) the stimulation of innovation 
and structural reorganisation; (5) the creation of an advantageous condition for economic growth by 
reforming market institutions and promoting SMEs; (6) the formation of reliable financial markets 
and (7) macroeconomic stabilization and reliance on domestic and foreign investors. Because the 
measures focused on providing support to minimise risk, there exists the risk that inefficient 
enterprises will survive (soft-budget constraints)
31. 
   Among various measures, the government increased its influence through increased holdings, 
and this policy can be regarded as a continuing one. Until the global crisis, the government enhanced 
                                                  
27 Mau (2009) discusses the following three concepts, which are related to each other: dirigisme, which includes 
central management of bailed-out banks; socialism (socialization of risk), where the government assumes the risk of 
the private sector; and populism, which includes support to manufacturers. 
28 INSOR (2009) divides the policy into three basic types (dirigisme with direct governance, liberal scenario by 
natural selection and liberal-dirigisme scenario); the first type was regarded as the real policy. 
29 The Russian government protested against the pessimistic estimations of the World Bank and the OECD 
(Kommersant Gen’gi, No.31, 06–12 April 2009). 
30  The revenue in the budget amounted to 6,713.6 billion rubles, and the deficit, to 2,978.4 billion rubles (7.4% of the 
GDP) (Vedomosti, 18 March 2009). Iu.Simachev et al. estimated the total outlay of the anti-crisis measures as 2.1-2,5 
trillion Rubles in October 2008-December 2009, of which access to the financial resources is 1.1-1.2 trillion, 
reduction of business burden 0.5-0.7 trillion, social security 0.25-0.3 trillion, the stimulation of domestic demand 
0.18-0.23 trillion, SMEs support 0.06-0.09 trillion (Iu.Simachev et al., Ekspert, No.15, April 2009). 
31  See Kornai (2009). 
 22‘nationalization’ by exercising strong control, and strategic industries (enterprises) were specially 
targeted to increase the Russian economy’s growth and security
32. In practice, ‘state control over 
economic activity is pervasive’, and the government increased its stake in strategic enterprises to a 
controlling or blocking level. An OECD report stated as follows: ‘The number of majority stakes of 
the federal government increased from 25% of the total holdings in 2005 to 61% in 2008
33. The 
state-owned enterprises are found in ubiquitous sectors, while banking, infrastructure, oil and gas, 
telecommunication, utilities and transportation sectors are dominant. A related development is the 
emergence of large state-controlled conglomerates, which have in some cases been established 
through the consolidation of existing SOEs’ (OECD, 2009, p.132). Further, the government has also 
established ‘a number of state corporations that have the special legal status of a non-commercial 
organization and are not subject to the Bankruptcy Law nor controlled by the Audit Chamber of the 
Russian Federation’ (OECD, 2009, p.132)
34. For example, Rostekhnologii acquired the stocks of 246 
open joint stock companies, and at the beginning of June 2009, the debts of this corporation 
amounted to 800 billion roubles (Ekonomika i zhizn’, No.24, June 2009). The state sector increased 
its share of assets in the banking sector from 46.5% in September 2008 to 54.3% in April 2009 
(Ekspert, No.20, 25–31 May 2009). 
 
Table 14 Main indicators of VEB (end of year, billion rubles) 
 2007  2008 
Assets 540.5  1597.2 
Credit portfolio  352.1  1061.6 
Net income on interest  4.1  20 
Operational expenditure  4.6  14.3 
profits 6.4  6.4 
Source: Vedomosti, 4 June 2009. 
 
   The anti-crisis policy has been implemented not only by the government but also by state 
organisations. The External Economy Bank (VEB: VneshEkonomBank) occupied a dominant 
position in the financial markets and invested 155 billion roubles from the Fund of National Welfare 
                                                  
32 In May 2008, the federal law on ‘Procedures of Making Foreign Investments in Business Entities of Strategic 
Importance to National Defense and Security of the State’ determined 42 strategic sectors, among which were 
defense-related sectors, high-technology and dual-purpose sectors and public communication sectors. Foreign 
ownership in these sectors was restricted to minority stakes (OECD, 2009, p.149). 
33  According to Troika Dialog, the share of market capitalization in the Russian equity market controlled by the state 
has increased from 24% in 2004 to 40% in 2007 (OECD, 2009, p.133). 
34 Deposit Insurance Organization (December 2003), Development and External Activity Bank (May 2007), 
Rosnanotekh (July 2007), Rostekhnologii (November 2007), Rosatom (December 2007), Olimpstroi (October 2007) 
and the Fund for Assistance in the Reform of Housing and Utilities (July 2007).   
 23for the acquisition of stocks (Vedomosti, 4 June 2009)
35 (Table 13). 
     After the M&A market shrank in 2008 due to a lack of liquidity, the government led the market 
and consolidated its shares. Above all, the banking sector acquired the largest share in the M&A 
market, and the main aim was not aggressive expansion but rather business survival. During the 
crisis, many firms were sold at token prices, for example, KIT-finance was sold for 100 roubles. 
Such cases were also pushed forward by the VEB (Svyaz’ Bank, Globeks Bank)
36. However, 
although the prices were low, buyers had to spend large amounts of money to restore many of the 
assets (Kuznetsova, 2009) (Table 15). 
 
Table 15 Assets sold by symbolized price 
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Gazpromenergobank  75% Soyuz  bank  n.d.  n.d.  December 
2008 
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$1  Moscow city  75% Sky 
Express 
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No cash  Sverbank  100% Moi 
gorod 
retail $  22 
million 
n.d. Q1  2009 




n.d. Q1  2009 
Source: Kuznetsova, 2009, p.11. 
 
      In addition, the government focused on the selective support of big businesses. The government 
designated 294 companies as System-formation Enterprises, and these companies were supported 
and subsidized along with approximately 1,000 defence enterprises
37. Town enterprises had also 
                                                  
35  VEB, Sberbank (saving bans), VTB and others. In January 2009, the VEB carried out a third of the transactions in 
the financial markets (INSOR, 2009, p.13). 
36  The Primister, V.Putin prohibited sale of state assets at the underestimated price on the pretext of the global crisis. 
However, this regulation did not extend over the state organizations(Sliyaniya i pogloscheniya, No.5, 2009, p.17). 
37  To choose the 294 enterprises, at the end of February 2009, 144 enterprises were screened and state guarantee for 
automobile manufactures was determined (Vedomosti, 16 March 2009). 
 24become targets of state support. The process tells us that strong lobbying for state support was the 
norm and that it was difficult for SMEs to receive support
38. The main sectors to receive state 
support were as follows: automobile and agricultural machines (190–200 billion roubles) and the 
defence-industrial complex (approximately 180 billion roubles) (GU-VSE and MATS, 2009, p.26). 
Therefore, as seen from procedures prescribed by the anti-crisis policy, the policy has the 
characteristics of an industrial policy and is mostly comprised of voluntary selective measures
39. 
   Through its policy, the government redistributed and consolidated enterprises
40. Before the 
beginning of 2008, the government consolidated more than 40–45% of the stocks of Russian 
companies; through the anti-crisis programme, its share increased by 9–10% (INSOR, 2009, p.13). 
Faced by the global crisis, which changed a growth economy with a twin surplus to a recessionary 
economy, Russia enhanced the basic structure (government governance) of a twin surplus. 
     However, GU-VSE and MATS (2009) are sceptical of the effectiveness of the anti-crisis policy: 
60% of the measures have a weak effect, and the compensation character is strong (Ekspert, No.15, 
April 2009)
41. Many economists regard that the stabilisation trend of the Russian economy is not due 
to the policy but due to the global market influence (Ekonomika i zhizn’, No.35, September 2009)
42. 
Moreover, the policy has exacerbated the negative aspects of the economy such as the worsening of 
competition; the continuance of distrust between businesses and the government; an immature civic 
society; and the existence of asymmetric information between business, the government, and others. 
Meanwhile, El’vira Nabiulina—the minister of economic development—deliberately announced that 
the government sought economic diversification and that the economy cannot be state controlled 
(Vedomosti, 4 June 2009)
43.  
   Because the crisis brought about difficulties for all economic actors, the social aspects can be 
regarded as a key point. Many focused on the increase in unemployment
44 and decline in regional 
economies. We can examine another case of nationalisation (Vedomosti, 29 April 2009). The 
government recommended an anti-crisis programme including work share, reduced working hours, 
job support, etc. 
The following phenomena can also occur: Employment shows a weak response in the face of the 
crisis, which reminds us of the situation in the first half of the 1990s. The informal sector expands 
and supports employment. Incomplete employment has increased and played a role of regulator in 
                                                  
38  The government cannot manage the enterprises due to a lack of transparency and corruption. Delyagin, Sheyanov 
(2009) criticized the government business and the list. 
39 The minister of finance admitted that even the system-formation enterprises bankrupt due to a lack of support 
(Sliyaniya i pogloscheniya, No.4, 2009). 
40  Bazovy Element sold its bank to Gazprom for a token price, and the VEB gained 20% of Rosbank (INSOR, 2009, 
p.13). 
41  The policy has a negative effect on medium enterprises. 
42  The effective subsidy to the enterprises needs resignation of top-managers of problem enterprises and restructuring 
programme. 
43  She estimated that the share of bad loans had reached 10–30% of the total from the global standard. 
44 Vladimir Gimpelson criticized that unemployment was unnable to convey accurate information on the crisis in 
Russia. (Vedomosti, 18 March 2009) 
 25this crisis. Although job destruction rate deteriorated and job vacancies decreased, labour utilisation 
rate in industry declined drastically, and we can estimate labour hoarding in the enterprise. In 
contrast to Japan, where irregular employment has become the main regulator, in Russia, the 
elasticity of employment is very low (Vladimir Gimpelson, Vedomosti, 18 March 2009)
45. 
In practice, wage arrears increased after the crisis. The total amount of unpaid wages reached 
8.779 billion roubles at the beginning of June 2009 (Ekonomika i zhizn’, No.24, June 2009)
46. In the 
first quarter of 2009, 8,835 public organizations and 2,005 legal persons were fined for unpaid wages, 
which increased by 35% since the first quarter of 2008. The state inspectors disclosed 32,989 illegal 
cases of payment in the first quarter of 2009. Moreover, it is believed that non-monetary transactions 
were revived. Barter and mutual settlements emerged in the timber manufacturing, construction and 
distribution sectors. For example, agricultural firms paid wages in kind, and these payments were 
based on agreements with employees (Vedomosti, 18 March 2009). 
The total number of cases where work hours were reduced reached 1.55 million in May 2009. 
Such cases were particularly found among town enterprises (Vedomosti, 8 May 2009). According to 
Rosstat, reductions in work hours through initiatives by employers jumped from 594.6 thousand in 
December 2008 to 1.01 million in February 2009; however, since February 2009, the number has 
been decreasing. At the same time, temporary holidays were also utilized to adjust work hours. Such 
adjustments can be frequently found in the manufacturing and construction sectors (28 August 2009, 
http://www.gks.ru). The above adjustments may be regarded as the Russian type response to the 
crisis. 
The above adaptation and state intervention indicates the robust foundation of the Russian 
society, where the relationship between the state and businesses is paternalistic and the economic 
actors (enterprises, regions and stakeholders of enterprises) exhibit specific behaviours when 
adapting to a crisis. 
 
4. Causes and the significance of the crisis in Russia 
The global financial crisis has revealed itself in the form of ‘subprime problems’, and various factors 
have contributed to this crisis. The following factors have been pointed out: the structural crisis of 
the ‘New Economy (service sector, asset based economy based information technology)’ and 
financial deregulation; overheated investments and the housing bubble; lack of liquidity and the 
credit crunch among financial organizations; mistakes made by the US government and Federal 
Reserve Board (FRB); market failure through securitization and the increases in the securitization 
risk; the uncertainty associated with derivatives; credit expansion through deregulation and 
uncontrolled financial technology; global inflow of excess money into forward markets 
                                                  
45  V.Gimpelson insisted that irrespectively of the crisis non-skilled workers have been dismissed in Russia. 
46  Overdue unpaid wages amounted to 6.478 billion rubles (28 August 2009, http://www.gks.ru). 
 26(deterioration of the real sector by price jumps and the outflow of funds); the linkage between 
uneasy psychology and panic; the real sector crisis stemming from a demand decline caused by 
drastic decreases in stock prices and the adverse wealth effect; a decline in investment, consumption 
and employment; an upturn in the interest rate from credit risk (monetary constraints); and others
47. 
In addition, there is a vicious circle that links the real sector crisis to the financial crisis. Mau (2009, 
pp.7–10) classifies the causes of the crisis into three categories: (1) the root factor of the inadequate 
financial policy of the US, (2) fundamental and systematic factors such as the very aggressive 
growth-oriented policies of developed countries and the development of financial technology, and 
(3) factors specific to Russia. From the perspective of global capitalism, the flow of global finance 
has changed,
48 and economic growth has become a key factor in the crisis. 
   The Russian crisis expresses the contemporary crisis as a ‘twenty-first century crisis’ (Hirata, 
1999, p.iii, 236-240). First, the international transfer of large amounts of private funds occurs on a 
global scale, and these transfers form a link between countries. Second, the role played by the IMF 
in global affairs is deteriorating. The IMF policy decreased its effects on a message to the market 
and emergency. Third, liberalization and deregulation have weakened the financial system. Fourth, 
heavy dependence on external funds has a harmful effect on enterprises, leading to enormous debts 
and large-scale defaults. Moreover, the instability is amplified by the frequent transfer of short-term 
funds for the purpose of risk avoidance. The global financial risk governance is in the crisis. 
   The crisis testifies to the fact that Russia is closely involved in the global economy and the 
international financial market. At the very least, price controls for petroleum did not originate in 
Russia, and financial transfers determine the health of the Russian economy. Cheap money easily 
flowed into Russian markets. The large amount of oil money with the subsequent price jumps has 
also resulted in surplus money in the global market, where advantageous investment destinations are 
constantly sought after. A synchronized recession not only prohibits decoupling of the crisis but also 
indicates the strong spill-over effects of the crisis. Russia experienced both success and failure as a 
result of not only the effects of the direct financial sector but also those of the price of petroleum. 
      The crisis in Russia indicates not only global factors but also domestic factors. In short, the crisis 
indicates the periodicity of business fluctuations (Aleksashenko, 2009, p.4, INSOR, 2009, p.4), and 
from the perspective of the synchronization of the business cycle with global capitalism, Russia has 
already completed the transition period. The synchronization of a crisis is not the same as the 
homogeneity of a crisis. Mau regards the contemporary crisis as a reflection of both the old and new 
crisis. In Russia, the soft budget and financial policy has lead to inflation, and the ensuing Russian 
crisis is characterized by stagflation (Mau, 2008). This process differs from that in developed 
                                                  
47  Based on the following papers: Grigoriev and Salikhov (2008) Nihonkeizai newspaper (16–19 December 2008), 
lecture of V.Kuznetsov on ‘the global crisis and Russia's economic development: key issues and implications for 
economic research’, KIER Research Seminar (9 January 2009). 
48  The surplus money flowed from developing countries to developed countries. 
 27countries (Mau, 2009). Owing to the relationship between price changes and economic growth, the 
2008 global crisis was characterized by a combination of depression under deflation with stagflation. 
Resource dependence strengthens the inflation trend. 
   As a result, anti-crisis measures are partially common to all countries. The typical measure is 
state intervention in the economy, which includes state control on individual enterprises and banks, 
socialization of risks, nationalization and capital injection and protectionist measures. The latter 
includes support to the consumers of domestic automobiles. Except for the strong control of the 
government on the private sector, the Russian measures do not have any special characteristics. 
   Concerning the international spill-over of the crisis, the IMF has focused on not only the 
relationship between developed countries and emerging markets but also country-specific factors. 
The latter includes channels for economic and financial linkages and the fragility of domestic 
financial institutions. In Russia, country-specific factors cannot be ignored. 
      In order to investigate country-specific factors, I will start with a historical comparison of crises 
in Russia. In Russia, a crisis does not occur once in a hundred years but rather once in ten years. At 
the very least, 1992, 1998 and 2008 are memorial years of crises in Russia; moreover, the three cases 
have unique backgrounds and causes. In particular, the political situation vastly differs in each case. 
Tables 16 and 17 illustrate the differences and similarities. 
 
Table 16 Comparison of crisis 
  Source of crisis  Acors of crisis  Volume of external 
debts ($ billion) 
External reserve 
($ billion) 





2008 crisis  Loans, global 






 Financial  deficits  Final  debtors 
1998 crisis  Large deficits  government 
2008 crisis  Stable surplus, austerity economic 
policy, sterilization policy 
Enterprises and banks (private but 
semi-government, government) 
Source: Ershov, 2008, p.14-24. 
 
   First, the depth of the crisis and the economy’s adaptation to it was determined by the political 
situation. That is, the state’s failure triggered the crises in Russia. In 1992 and 1998, the instability of 
 28the government inadvertently introduced a global shock
49. In 1998, the mismanagement of GKO 
culminated in a crisis. In 2008, the mismanagement of CBR came to light (Aleksashenko, 2009, 
pp.7–8). An unbalanced macroeconomic policy (which did not manage inflation or control hard 
currency) created an overheated economy, and ineffective financial supervision destabilized the 
domestic financial markets. A twin surplus reduced the significance of institutional reforms. Lacking 
a policy for diversification, the government restricted foreign investment in the economy. 
 
Table 17 Comparison of three crises 
 1992  1998  2008/2009 
Political crisis  Yes  Yes  No 
Decline of demand 
Yes 
accompanied 




Yes linked with cyclical 
recession in the global 
economy and overheat in the 
non-trade sector 
Decline of oil price  No  Yes  Yes 
Currency crisis  Yes 
Yes affected by managed 
devaluation of ruble and 
rejection of exchange rate 
change by monetary 
authority 
Yes affected by appreciation 
of ruble and rejection of 
exchange rate change by 
monetary authority 
Instable state budget  Yes  Yes 
No A decline of revenue does 
not bring about instabilisation 





Yes The main debtors 
were state 
Yes The main debtors were 
corporate sector 
Capital flight  No 
Yes Short-term state 
borrowing led outflow of 
capital for clearing GKO 
Yes Foreign investment led 
outflow of capital for 
declining markets 
Source: Aleksashenko, 2009, pp.8-9. 
 
   Second, despite the striking differences between each stage, the fact that Russia is a resource- 
and energy-abundant country is regarded as a key factor when characterizing the causes and 
outcomes of the crisis. O.Dmitrieva regarded the resource based economy as the fundamental factor 
of the current crisis, and the business situation was inevitably influenced from the developed 
consumption countries (Ershov et al., 2009, p.14). A severe drop in oil prices deteriorated Russia’s 
economic performance, and its dependence on the external market increased in the process of 
                                                  
49  See Ershov (2008), Grigoriev and Salikhov (2008), Aleksashenko (2009). 
 29economic growth. This characteristic indicates the following similarities. First, increased capital 
flight made foreign currency management more difficult. There was excessive sensitivity to the 
global financial markets, and the exchange rate became very high. Second, the government relied 
heavily on the oil and gas sector for its revenues. Third, a relaxation in the restrictions on capital 
transfers increased dependence on foreign capital. External capital became an organic component 
referred to as the parallel economy (Kheifets, 2007, p.54), and a capital outflow of funds brought in 
by foreign investors caused the collapse of the capital markets. A heavy reliance on foreign capital 
destabilized the capital markets (Ershov, 2008, pp.15–16). Fourth, the supply capability of crude oil 
has lost its effect as a decisive determinant of the price of petroleum and petroleum-based products, 
and financial operations have become the main factors in price making. In particular, in the 2000s, 
the forward market has expanded and speculation has intensified (Gaidar, Chubais, 2008, pp.10–19). 
Under the financial crisis, speculative funds rushed into the crude oil forward market; in July 2008, 
the price reached $147, which was ten times higher than that in the 1990s. In short, the fragility of 
the Russian markets strengthened under a twin surplus. Finally, Russia spontaneously created and 
imported a distorted bubble economy based on cheap international money and oil money. In both 
cases, with energy dependence in the backdrop, the Russian economy had been deeply involved in 
global financial relations. 
      Thirdly, the specificities of Russian market institutions multiplied the fragility of the market. The 
market was segmented due to its monocultural structure, the failure to diversify and the presence of 
regional gaps. The fragility of the domestic financial market made financing more delicate 
(Grigoriev, Salikov, 2008). The domestic monetary circulation of savings in the market has been 
insufficient because of the low capital rate offered by banks and immature corporate bond markets 
(INSOR, 2009, p.5). The strong hand of the government strengthened its monopolization. Moreover, 
the speculative character of business administration has been strong. Mizobata (2008, p.21) 
concluded that IPOs have not brought about an increase in investments; indeed, M&As and an 
increase in the current capitalization value have encouraged managers to speculate. For example, the 
enterprise group Bazel has adopted an enlargement policy based on M&As. This group has the 
following characteristics: the organization of a complex ownership structure with offshore 
companies, linkage with the government, a competition-restrictive M&A policy, distorted funds for 
M&As and a lack of transparency. Pure profits were paid to the individual owners as dividends, and 
they were used for funding the M&As. The above characteristics can be observed in many big 
businesses. Opaque ownership and speculative behaviours persist, and these may be regarded as 
deep-rooted characteristics of Russian corporations. In addition, the following features are peculiar 
to market institutions in Russia: lobbying and state-business relations, the linkages of business and 
region-like town enterprises and original adaptation to crises. Although the Russian market initially 
remained normal in the face of the global crisis, the Russian peculiarities (concentration of 
 30ownership in the hands of a few parties, resource-dependent structures, opaqueness of ownership 
guarantees, and fragile financial markets) clearly exacerbated the crisis and continued to work as an 
abnormal market factor. The above features determine the low quality of the Russian market due to a 
lack of well coordinated market infrastructure and institutions. 
   From the perspective of market transition, paradoxically speaking, it can be stated that the 
Russian transition concluded as a result of a close linkage with the global market as well as the 
regressive institutional changes and regeneration of embedded institutions. However, the end of 
market transition does not mean that one needs to build an Anglo-Saxon-type liberal market 
economy. As far as the state continues intervening and businesses do not lose their paternalistic 
behaviour, the Russian-type coordinated market will continue to be fragile. The weak 
competitiveness along with profits from abundant resources becomes a catalyst for crises, and the 
sustainability of the market institutions is undermined by conditions such as aging equipment
50 and 
shortage of labour force and skills. 
 
Conclusion 
The global crisis has spilled over to transition economies and Russia. Although transition economies 
(emerging markets) have shown visible evidence of progress in building market institutions, 
economically integrating into the global market and contributing to the international division of 
labour, the crisis, for the most part, pushed transition economies into the hard landing scenario. 
   The Russian economy enjoyed high economic growth with a twin surplus in the 2000s. The 
government succeeded in doubling the income in a relatively short period. The growth was 
accompanied by a drastic and distorted economic structure. In the 2000s, the Russian economy relied 
excessively on exports of energy and natural resources (monoculture) and cheap international money. 
Superficially, the structure looks similar to that of, for example, a developing country in Africa. 
Fortunately or not, the global market was full of cheap and surplus money supplied by developed 
countries. The oil market was naturally selected due to its profitability, and Russia seemed to enjoy 
the blessings of this advantageous business environment. At this point, Russia was synchronized 
with the global capitalist business cycle. The growth, however, became a risk factor. An adverse 
trend in the business cycle (global recession) affected Russia instantly.   
      The crisis spread from the national economy to local economies and from the financial sector to 
the real sector. In Russia, the shock may be regarded as greater than that in developed countries, and 
this shock is expected to continue for a few years. 
   The outcomes of the crisis in Russia indicate similarities and differences in the crises faced by 
developed countries. A typical outcome is the strong hand of the state; in addition, some specificities 
                                                  
50 At the beginning of 2008, the outdated (no longer serviceable) machines occupied 51.1% in enterprises 
(Ekonomika i zhizn', No.26, June 2009). 
 31of the Russian market were revealed. As a result, the crisis has a specific significance for Russia. 
Russia has completed its market transition. Russia liberalized markets to allow global finance, and a 
parallel economy has become interwoven in its domestic and external markets. Moreover, the 
anti-crisis programme and adaptive behaviour of corporations were based on the market specificities. 
      Although after the first quarter of 2009 we can observe a positive recovery sign, the result cannot 
be considered as very successful. The prospects of state control are unknown, and a means to escape 
the monoculture (path of diversification) is yet to be discovered. Moreover, the Russian economic 
system has faced restrictive conditions that have hampered its development and sustainability. Even 
after the crisis, Russia continues to face a market that is both fragile and robust. 
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